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LAWRENCE B. KLEIN
NOTE~ The relevant passage from the Andersen
paper appears in italics preceding each of Professor
Klein’s comments.
Leonall C. Andersen’s account of the issues is
stated so well that I was immediately drawn into a
detailed reading of this fascinating material. Of
course, since I stand on the ~‘other side” of the de-
bate, I felt compelled to take issue with specific
points although I found the piece, as a whole, very
attractive.
Econometric models continued to stress the interest
rate channel and shied away from incorporating any
influence of real money balances, For example,
when simulations of the original Klein-Goldberger
model of the late I950s showed that the real balance
effect swamped all other influences, the monetary
sector was dropped from the model because such a
result was deemed “unrealistic” and “implausible”.
(p. 3, left col., 3rd para.)
it is true that Arthur Goldberger found that
“money market effects swamped all other effects
in an implausible way” when he computed dynamic
multipliers for the model. It is also the case that re-
sults that looked implausible in 1959 may not appear
to be so today. This does not mean, however, that
the monetary sector was dropped from the model,
as Andersen asserts. It merely means that this sector
was dropped for Coldberger’s method of evaluation
of dynamic multipliers from a linear approximation
to the model. They were not otherwise dropped.
With today’s technology for digital evaluation of
multipliers, we do not make linear approximations.
Also, we do not necessarily make ceteris paribus
(Continued on p. 10)
KARL BRUNNER
Leonall C. Andersen notes correctly that theoretical
issues, policy problems, and research strategy have
been closely related in recent controversies. This in-
terrelation may be recognized by rearranging the is-
sues covered by Andersen into four broad groups
which summarize the central contentions of the con-
troversies. An explicit restatement of the nature of
the issues seem.s useful in order to remove irrelevant
contentions or misconceptions concerning the propo-
sitions involved. My summary is guided by the four
questions entered at the head of each section below.
(1) How Do Money and Fiscal Policy
Influence Economic Activity?
The orthodox Keynesian view contends that all
information bearing on the transmission of monetary
impulses is contained in the slope properties of the
IS-LM diagram. A Pigovian modification includes
shifts in the IS curve associated with the real balance
effect. The evolution of the neo-Keynesian views
flattened the slope of the IS curve. Keynesian analy-
sis thus gradually reassessed the influence of money
and monetary policy.
These changes in the perspective concerning the
relative strength of monetary imnpulses did not modify
the comparative role of fiscal and monetary policy in
a stabilization program. The primary role was still
assigned to fiscal policy with monetary policy con-
fined to a “passively permissive” role. This concept of
(Continued on p. 12)
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calculations of dynamic multipliers. More often, we
make mutatis mutandis evaluations of dynamic mul-
tipliers; that is, we compute deviations from an “equi-
librium” (or “control” or “baseline”) dynamic path.
Along such a path reserves can grow in an accom-
modating fashion, and other exogenous variables can
also change as they will. In a generalized approach
to dynamic multiplier analysis, we would not neces-
sarily find that monetary effects swamp all other
effects.
Changes in the trend growth of money are consid-
ered the dominant, not the exclusive, determinant of
the trend of nominal CNP and the price level. Long-
run movements in output are little influenced by
changes in the growth rate of money. Trend move-
ments in output are essentially determined by the
growth of such factors as the labor force, natural re-
sources, capital stock, and technology. (p. 3, left
Co1., 5th para.)
The claim here is that the trend growth of money
is the dominant determinant of both nominal GNP
and the price level. This is an imputation of remark-
able power to money. If the economy is at full capac-
ity or full employment real GNP and if it is asserted
that money determines price level, then it is trivial
to say that it also determines nominal GNP. If the
economy is not necessarily at full equilibrium, then
it is remarkable, indeed, that money is such a power-
ful variable that it is predominant in the determina-
tion of both nominal GNP and price level. I don’t
believe a word of it.
There is no doubt that money has been assigned a
more prominent role in recent years, but not to the
extent advocated by monetarists. Econometric model
builders have begun to give greater recognition to
money. For example, Lawrence Klein has reported
that the Wharton model now has a real money bal-
ance effect and that now the model predicts better.
Simulations of the MIT-FRB model, which had
Franco Modigliani as one of the principal architects,
demonstrate the long-run properties of money as
stressed by monetarists; namely, changes in money,
in the long run, influence mainly the price level.
(p. 4, left col., 2nd para.)
It is true that econometric model builders are now
giving greater recognition to money, but I don’t
think the right reasons are conveyed to the reader.
(i) It should be remembered that Tinbergen de-
voted a great deal of attention to the money market
in trying to interpret the 1920s in his celebrated
League of Nations study. In my own work, I have
studied real balance effects since early model build-
ing efforts at the Cowles Commission in the late
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1940s (Economic Fluctuations in the United States,
1921-1941). I took up the problem again in micro
econometric studies of the Surveys of Consumer
Finances (Contributions of Survey Methods to Eco-
nomics) and introduced real balance effects in the
original formulations of the Klein-Goldberger Model
in the early 1950s. There is nothing unusual about
the fact that such effects appear again in the new
Wharton Model (Mark III). It is just a continuation
of research started more than 25 years ago and quite
unrelated to today’s monetarist debate.
(ii) As early as 1960, when a planning committee
was outlining work for the SSRC model project
(later the Brookings Model), the executive allocated
responsibility to Daniel Brifi and associates of the
Federal Reserve Board for the development of a
monetary sector, on a par with all other sectors. We
recognized the importance of monetary factors from
the start, but not along the lines now pursued by
the monetarist school,
(iii) The reason why more attention is now being
paid to monetary aspects in econometric model con-
struction is that present samples of data cover a
richer experience that was not previously available.
The wartime accumulation of liquid assets first stim-
ulated our curiosity, but it was not until the mid-
1950s that interest rates showed appreciable vari-
ance. The monetary crises of 1966 and 1969-70 again
enriched our data experience. The whole history of
macro-econometric model building has been one of
expansion through system enlargements, inclusion of
more detail, and direction of added attention to
specific sectors. It is no surprise that increased atten-
tion to the monetary sector should be taken up now,
especially as. flow-of-funds data become more ac-
cessible. In a similar way, increasing attention is
being paid to the international sector, as the United
States has more trade and payments crises. Gradually,
model builders will cover all sectors of contemporary
interest.
Both the MIT-FRB model and the Data Resources
model, which are built along post-Keynesian lines,
have a zero Government spending multiplier with
regard to ,tal output. (p. 5, right col., 3rd para.)
Most American models, other than the St. Louis
model, imply fiscal multipliers that rise fairly quickly
to values between 2.0 and 3.0, They fluctuate in a
narrow range for a number of years and then de-
cline. This is brought out clearly in the analysis of
the NBER/NSF Seminar on Model Comparison
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Review (May 1973).] For the only period of policy
relevance (before many other changes, besides the
original fiscal policy change, have taken place) the
fiscal multipliers are estimated to be substantial by a
broad consensus. In a practical sense, for purposes
of economic policy formulation, the latest results
seem to cause no change in the standard analysis of
the fiscal school.
Monetarists have developed mostly theoretical ar-
guments in support of the “no trade-off” [inflation-
unemployment] proposition. it is not denied that a
short-run trade-off exists, but it is denied that such
a trade-off exists in the long run. The crucial con-
sideration involves the formation of price expecta-
tions, a variable generally neglected until recently in
post-Keynesian analysis. (p. 6, left col., 3rd para.)
Surely, it is not right to say that the post-Keynesian
analysis has neglected, until fairly recently, price
expectations. A variable representing such expecta-
tions has always been in the theoretical and the
associated econometric analyses. I would say that
careful analysis of this variable has a thirty-five year
history. In some cases price expectations were em-
pirically represented by distributed lags of prices and
in other cases by direct measurement in sample sur-
veys. It is a difficult variable to measure properly,
and the surrogates have not always been good, but
it has never been neglected. One might criticize the
simple approximations to anticipated prices that I
used in Economic Fluctuations, but the recognition
of the significance of expectations was quite explicit.
when prices rise at a constant rate, and if the
expected rate of price change is the same, the un-
employment rate will be at its normal rate and will
remain there until a shock occurs. This normal
unemployment rate is determined by such factors as
cost of labor market information, labor mobility, job
discrimination, and laws and organizations which
impede the free functioning of the labor market. (p.
6, left col., 4th para.)
The concept of a “normal unemployment rate” as
it is used in modern macro-analysis does not seem to
me to be very useful. To a large extent, it is used
euphemistically to cover up real problems in achiev-
ing what is easily measurable as a broadly accepted
statistical target of full employment at 4.0 percent.
For my own tastes, I think that 4.0 percent is a
pretty poor performance target for a modem indust
trial state and would prefer the range of 3.0-3.5 per-
cent. In any event, I think that it would be unfortu-
nate if the monetarist-fiscalist debate got locked into
assumed agreement on the so-called “normal unem-
ployment rate” as a target.
I now turn to the next issue — the dispute regarding
the monetarist contention that the economy is in-
herently stable. Post-Keynesians contend otherwise.
Samuelson has summarized a few factors which he
believes affect money GNP even if money is held
constant:
“(1) ... any significant changes in thriftiness
and the propensity to consume -.. .(2) -. -an
exogenous burst of investment opportunities or
animal spirits (p. 7, left col., 4th para.)
I don’t think that it is correct to say that Post-
Keynesians contend that the economy is inherently
unstable. They may contend that it is oscillatory or
subject to fluctuations and that it has a tendency to
move about a position of underemployment equili-
brium, but this is far different from saying that the
economy is unstable. The quotation cited from Paul
Samuelson is one that I would commonly associate
with a theory of the business cycle that he taught me
three decades ago, with an ancestry related to
Spiethoff, Tougan Baranovsky, Sehumpetter, and
Hansen. Their views can be superimposed on the
Keynesian system, to derive a formally stable cycli-
cal process.
Little empirical evidence has been produced in
support of either view [degree of economic stability].
Post-Keynesians offer simulations of the response of
their models to shocks, while the challengers appeal
more to casual empiricism. (p. 7, right Col., 1st para.)
The Wharton Model (Econometric Models of Cy-
clical Behavior) and the Klein-Goldberger Model
(“The Dynamic Properties of the Klein-Coldberger
Model,” Adelman and Adelman; “On The Possibility
of Another ‘29”) have been shocked in many sepa-
rate studies. A number of these have been published.
They consider both once-and-for-all exogenous and
repeated stochastic shocks. A persistent finding is
that the models of the underlying dynamic economic
system are quite stable. In the case of once-and-for-
all shocks, there is a strong tendency for the system
to return to a long-run growth path after a severely
damped oscillatory movement. In the cases of sto-
chastic shocks, a stable oscillatory movement occurs.
A. L. Nagar’s stochastic simulations of the Brookings
Model (The Brookings Model: Some Further Re-
sults) appear also to be stable.
As in the case of several of the other issues in the
debate, the central point of contention of the inher-
ent stability issue appears to be a matter of timing.
Several econometric models built along post-Keyne-
sian lines show, by simulation experiments, that
shocks are absorbed over a fairly long period of time
and do not produce cycles. On the other hand, mone-
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tarists postulate a shorter period for adjustment. (p.
7, right col., 3rd para.)
As noted in the preceding comment, simulations
of econometric models built along post-Keynesian
lines do show important business cycle characteris-
tics. It is a strong claim on the part of such model
builders that these systems are capable of generating
the cycle, as it has been historically measured, when
the models are subjected to repeated shocks in sto-
chastic simulations. I regard this as a basic validation
feature of contemporary econometric model building
research, and this is an integral part of my challenge
to the monetarists, to see whether they can do as
well in reproducing accepted measures of cyclical
characteristics from simulations of their models. Ia m
disappointed in their not following this line of eco-
nometric research.
Let us now turn to the final issue — the appropriate
time horizon for stabilization policy. Post-Keynesians,
with their view that the economy is basically un-
stable, have advocated very active stabilization ac-
tions in the short run. (p. 7, right eol., 4th para.)
policy is a consequence of the Keynesian interpreta-
tion of the transmission mechanism which persists
independently of the changes noted above. Apart
from a more or less significant real balance effect,
monetary impulses are conveyed in the usual Keyne-
sian view by the play of interest rates on financial
assets. Thus, the transmission of monetary impulses
depends on the responses of the small proportion of
expenditure categories with comparatively high bor-
rowing costs. The Keynesian view therefore implies
that applications of monetary policy burden a com-
paratively small sector with the task of swinging the
whole economy in the desired direction. This means
that this view of the transmission mechanism assigns
substantial social costs to the use of monetary policy.
In contrast, stabilization programs based on fiscal ad-
justments apparently impose lower social costs for
similar social benefits.
It is commonly known that monetarist analysis re-
jects the assessment of monetary and fiscal policies
offered by the Keynesian view. It is not commonly
understood, however, that the conflicting views bear-
ing on policy programs follow from a fundamental
difference in the conceptions governing the substitu-
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At this point, I repeat earlier comments that post-
Keynesians do not hold the “. ..view that the eco-
nomy is basically unstable
(Section entitled “Present State of the Debate”, p. 8)
Andersen sums up the debate nicely in these con-
cluding paragraphs. Without accepting his view
about the workings of the economy, I find that I can
accept his view of the issues and procedures for
continuing research on resolving some of the main
issues. Careful statistical study of the evidence fol-
lowing best econometric practice can probably do
much to settle some of the debatable issues. It is
extremely healthy and welcome to see the debate
shift from speculative theorizing, casual empirical
referencing, and unsupported asserting, to serious
work in applied econometrics. We may not resolve
matters, but we shall learn more about the crucial
issues and know where each side stands. We shall
probably find out what would be needed in order to
convince both sides of the correctness or incorrect-
ness of their positions.
tion relations of money. Keynesians constrain the sub-
stitution to money and financial assets of a similar risk
class. On the other hand, monetarists postulate that
transactions dominating assets (that is, money) sub-
stitute in all directions over the whole array of other
assets. This difference implies that monetarist analysis
rejects the IS-LM framework as an adequate repre-
sentation of monetary processes.
Also, monetarist analysis does not accept the idea
that the slope properties of such diagrams contain all
the relevant information pertaining to the transmis-
sion of monetary impulses. In contrast, the credit
market, usually dismissed or disregarded in Keynesian
analysis, emerges with an important function in mone-
tarist analysis. It follows that the impact of monetary
actions on interest rates cannot be interpreted simply
as a “liquidity effect” resulting from the interaction
between money demand and money stock.
Furthermore, the role of the government sector’s
budgct position and its impact on the economy via
asset markets are thus accessible to monetarist analy-
sis, but not to Keynesian analysis. Also, the Keynesian
distinction between the “direct effects” of fiscal poi-
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icy and the “indirect effects” of monetary policy are
recognizably conditioned by the peculiarities of the
Keynesian transmission mechanism. Once the nature
of the contending views is properly understood, we
may hopefully mnove in our empirical research be-
yond Samuelson’s attempt to force the issue into the
Keynesian strait jacket by trying to reduce it to con-
flicting propositions about the interest elasticity of
money.
(2) Does the Economy Produce Self-sustaining
Fluctuations of Major Magnitudes?
Keynesians usually answer this question in the af-
firmative. The General Theory contains several pas-
sages emphasizing the tenuous nature of long-run
expectations and the unreliable gyrations of the mar-
ginal efficiency of investment. On the other hand,
monetarists stress the shock absorbing capacity of the
market process and the load factors usually produced
by an unstable government and policy process. It is
noteworthy that some of the exemplifications offered
in Keynes’ work, in spite of the general passages
mentioned, actually support the monetarist thesis.
The contentions swirling around the stability of the
economic process certainly require substantial further
examination. Keynesians usually postulate that inter-
action between economic and political processes sta-
bilize and at least do not destabilize the economy.
Monetarists, on the other side, argue that such inter-
action operates more frequently in a destabilizing and
welfare-reducing direction. It should be noted that
Keynesians offer little evidence supporting their views.
It is particularly noteworthy that all econometric mod-
els cast in a Keynesian mold, and examined in detail
thus far, imply the monetarist stability thesis and
reject the Keynesian thesis of an unstable process
generating self-sustaining fluctuations of substantial
magnitudes. But the monetarist case is not yet firmly
established and the issue will persist.
(3) Apart From An Unstable Process, What
Forces Produce Economic Fluctuations?
Fiscalis.t Keynesians answer with a description of
fiscal policy and stress the crucial significance of in-
formation about fiscal policy in order to appraise
future economic trends. Others emphasize the role of
a Wicksell-Keynes process and offer quotes about the
autonomous operation of “animal spirits” affecting the
anticipated real net yield on real capital, Monetarists,
of course, stress the role of monetary impulses ap-
proximated by relative changes of some measure of
the money stock. These differences in the views about
the driving impulse forces should not be miscon-
strued into absolute categories. They involve state-
ments asserting the comparative dominance and
persistence of specific impulses. Moreover, the mone-
tarist thesis does not require termination of empirical
research with a beautiful time series exhibiting ac-
celerations and decelerations of the money stock.
Some monetarists penetrated substantially “behind”
this phenomenon to establish a link between a coun-
try’s financial institutions and the nature of the policy
process. It follows, therefore, that the question of
exogeneity or endogeneity of the money stock attracts
only a mild interest for the resolution of our major
issues.
(4) Do We Need the Allocative (Sectoral)
Details For The Understanding of An
Economy’s Macro-Behavior?
Many, but not necessarily all, Keynesians will an-
swer affirmatively. On the other hand, monetarists
emphasize the approximate separation of allocative
and aggregative processes. They assert that one set of
forces explains the position of relative price changes
under a given distribution of such changes, and an
essentially different set of forces explains the position
of the whole distribution. They contend, therefore,
that a detailed description of which relative price
changes are located where under the distribution,
yields no relevant information about the inflationary
thrust of an economy. Some aggregative significance
is, however, recognized for specific allocative pat-
terns (currency ratio, time deposit ratio, investment
ratio for the long-run resource effect but not for the
short-run demand effect).
There remains a fundamental conflict on this issue
which has molded substantial differences in research
strategy. The producers of large scale econometric
models are motivated by a denial of the monetarist
thesis, and the latter implies a research strategy ad-
dressed to small models, partial hypotheses, and a
gradual build-up of theories by combining relatively
“simple” building blocks. Monetarists would also claim
that they are less interested in technical sophistication
per se, and assign more weight to economic content.
Concluding Observations
Keynesian analysis usually resolves the problem of
interpreting monetary trends by relying on interest
rates- This decision is justified by references to the
central role of interest rates in the tran.smission mech-
anism of their models.
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Monetarists claim, on the other hand, that Keyne-
sians have adopted, without analytic reasons, the
central bank tradition of gauging the tightness or ease
of monetary policy by the level of, or movements in,
market interest rates. The IS-LM diagram implies that
changes in interest rates would serve as a reliable
indicator of monetary events if the IS curve is rigidly
fixed and money demand is stable (ignoring the ef-
fects of changing price expectations on interest rates).
Monetarists, however, contend that in a world in
which the IS curve is changing and perhaps money
demand is shifting, interest rate movements do not
give reliable signals as to the tightness or ease of
monetary policy. Unfortunately, the nature of the
interpretation problem does not seem to be well under-
stood, and an ossified inheritance persists in the litera-
ture. On the other hand, some progress can be noted
in the determination of suitable policies and policy
procedures. Both analytic examinations and simula-
tions of econometric models have opened avenues
for exploration to resolve the issues of policy strategy
which should be acceptable to all parties in the con-
troversy. The progress made in the analysis of the
determination problem of monetary policy eventually
may be matched by similar progress in the interpre-
tation problem.
And so, svhere do we stand? Surely, the questions
and positions have changed over the past twenty
years. Beyond the noise of the ongoing debate, the
gradual effect of searching examination was bound to
modify subtly the views of Keynesians and mone-
tarists. Moreover, the four major issues allow a variety
of combinations, Some economists may reject the
monetarist impulse hypothesis, but accept the mone-
tarist view of the transmission mechanism. The evolu-
tion of such a spectrum with a “middleground” should
enrich our future research activities. Such activities
should yield substantive results over the years to the
extent that economists successfully avoid the “media
propensity” of equating all issues with ideological
positions.
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